четверг, 22 февраля 2018 г.

New Era for Defenders of Russia


 A Seminar to clarify points in Lectures I-II[1]
‘RETHINKING AUTOCRACY PREVENTION STRATEGY’
by Vladimir Lukov, The Russian Soft Power School,
Moscow, The Russian Federation
Here is a short retelling of this text - https://www.facebook.com/vladimir.lukov.16/videos/1100888460054267/ (25 min.)
Please resend this link to concerned NGOs and Funds.
                                      Summary
-       The Munich Security Conference-2018 has ignored a set of very important issues. The participants presented anything, but the role of citizens with Soft Power tools in Global Security issues[2]. My concept of All-People Self-Defense vs. Autocracy (ASVA) is a vital dimension of Global War against Terrorism (GWAT), bearing in mind Terror from Above as a trigger for Terror from Below (Streets); ASVA deals with modeling & applying citizen-agents inside Internet-Networking into national acting systems of Counter-Terrorism. This Counter-Terrorism modeling uses clear mathematic approaches and common computing languages that can not be altered with a ‘Human Factor’ (falsified, in plain English);
-       Though, there are vague perspectives for Soft Power in Russia, because of inertia of Terror from Above and Below;
-       ASVA could be developed through monitoring and evaluation of mass data from citizens to create unified math indicators (indexes) to integrate Russia-NATO effort in the GWAT;
-       Reducing Terror from Above leads to lessening responsive Terror from Below. It is a long-term strategy for Free Enterprise and investments in Russia;
-       Autocratic pressure on businesses makes them escape into ‘grey zones of criminals and corruption’ and terrorist ‘harbors & heavens’ to be described in roadmaps for investors.
Issues for discussions and re-thinking
In the Soviet times, all international and domestic problems for the Kremlin power were considered as constant threats of the Capitalism to the Communist State Bureaucracy in the ‘sieged castle’ paradigm. The latter has been revived under Putin’s autocracy with the same fake-values of National Defense of Soviet & Post-Soviet types, but under heavier financial burden.
 The public opinion in Russia is filled with Mass Media myths about threats to Putin’s Autocracy from Global & Domestic Terrorism, meaning All-Human and democratic values.
The same criminal torture of facts about the NATO and the USA in the GWAT has been widely spread inside the Military, federal and regional elites in Russia and the CIS.
Only a few dozens, not hundreds (!) of experts on Counter-Terrorism are available for talks and decision-making measures in All-People Self-Defense vs. Autocracy prevention strategy. The existing so-called ‘Anti-Terrorism’ serves as a façade of the Kremlin’s Autocracy.
The urgent need to ruin such a façade appeared after ugly events in Beslan, Dagestan (2004). That Terror from Above was under pseudo-investigations by the Autocratic Kremlin itself. The same model of ‘Anti-Terrorism’ was applied against Ukraine and Syria.
The time for rethinking Autocratic prevention strategy has come with threatening signs of future regional wars in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
After heavy casualties in ‘hybrid wars’ in Donbas, Syria and Kurdish Iraq the Kremlin’s ‘Anti-Corruption Anti-Terrorism’ in Dagestan[3] is to get a new foot-stand against democratic changes in the NIS and a tool of pressure on the NATO-Iran-Israel-Arabs conflicts.
Growing danger of Terror from Above after the ‘election-2018’ is to safeguard Putin’s autocratic power.
That is why Autocracy Prevention Strategy has ripened as the Russian National Security’s necessity. For this purpose the term of Soft Power in Public Security seems to become a new educational agenda in Russia during/after Putin’s rule.   
The distrust of Society to the Military, Police and Special Services as ‘bosses in the country’ is overwhelming. The recent surfing on the Internet has shown: 89% distrusted and only 11% trusted in glory, competence and dignity of Putin’s Law enforcement and his Military.
Towards a multi-dimensional Public Security paradigm
For recent decades, NATO countries were focused mainly on nuclear threats prevention of Russia in the paradigm of the coming Armageddon a la Ruse[4]. But after the 9/11 events, nuclear and radiological threats have become far more prioritized items of national security issue than before in the USA and other NATO countries, unluckily not in Russia herself.
In the USA there is probably no more important foreign policy goal than keeping nuclear weapons, their ingredients and know-how to make them out of the hands of terrorists.
As to Russia, technically, nobody in the Street and in the Kremlin (the office people) - old and new bureaucracy circles - knows much about dirty-bombs or chemical/biological weaponry.
It’s a result of inertia of the Cold War when attacks were expected from hostile states, not from non-governmental actors like Al-Kaida and the ISIS.
The Soviet State bureaucracy could not cope even with threats and panics among the population while the Chernobyl radiation contamination events. Now, there is, practically, the same level of Federal or regional “preparedness” to combat nuclear or/and radiological threat, if any. 
In the past, Russians considered themselves to be ready to combat nuclear threats from Americans and their allies. Today, the population of Russia is more afraid of growing poverty and manipulated “justice” by the Kremlin as Terror from Above.
These two threatening factors are, willy-nilly, to unite modern terrorists with concerned and irritated citizens who wish to avoid Putin’s murderous schemes in the so-called “The United Russian World”.
The recent destruction of the private military company ‘Wagner’ in Syria with highly effective strikes by the USA was a cold shower on hot heads in the Kremlin.   
Anti-terrorism methods of the Russian Siloviki or the Power Sector are still at the basis of the Kremlin’s Counter-Terrorism policies. They have proved to be quite inadequate to declared tasks of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).
A more comprehensive, proactive, and intelligence-based Counter-Terrorism approach is required. We are talking about Public Security matters that could be more effective and preventive, but not reactive in the GWOT.
It is more and more evident that the “only and lonely” Putin’s Power Sector against Terrorism does not work.
After recent shootings in he US schools (2018) President Trump is about to replace his non-effective law enforcement forces with First Responders from NGOs of concerned citizens. 
Math & Software Counter-Terrorism
A new concept of Russia-NATO Security planning and operations is needed, as well. It could be used against any terrorist threat at hand or/and in a distance.
We should believe that social abnormalities definitely produce “fuel” for Terrorism. Threats must be measured, calculated and formatted in a set of software programs in advance.
The era of Internet has transformed Public and National Security. Now they should be looked at as a widening network of the so-called preventive “Software Counter-Terrorism”.
But, first of all, there must be common computer languages that make the very calculation of facts and files about Terror easy and correct. These data are to come from NGOs, which might form a monitoring & evaluation network over terrorists’ minds and intentions. Thus, we may track down particular courses of actions to which NGO members as agents of Public Security infrastructures have committed in order to signal about certain terrorist threats and corresponding events in advance.
Each intention is a set of plans. Events may start off the execution of plans that have relevant triggering events. We should predict social and/or economic environment (Social Counter-Terrorism), as well as terrorists’ sets of mind based on perception of some external/domestic events.
Multi-agents’ signals on the Internet generate the agent's own execution of a plan (i.e., a sub-goal in a plan that generates an event in “addition to achievement goal”). In the latter case, the event is accompanied with the intention, which generated it. Certain software programs might screen this event that will be pushed on top of terrorists’ intentions to intercept in time.
External events create new intentions, representing separate focuses of attention for the agent's acting on the environment. Prearrangement exists for internal events corresponding to controlled and updated terrorist dogmas to create active Soft Power forms of Counter-Terrorism.
So we may rely on the functioning AgentSpeak (L) computing interpreter, which is clearly described below. The link[5] will lead you to the picture with sets of beliefs, events, plans, and intentions of dealers/advocates of Terror from Above/Below. They are represented as rectangles. Diamonds represent selection (of one element from a set). Circles represent some of the processing involved in the interpretation of AgentSpeak (L) programs.
At every interpretation cycle of an agent program, the interpreter updates a list of events, which may be generated from perception of the environment, or from the execution of intentions (when sub-goals are specified in the body of plans). Beliefs    are either updated from perception or from plan controlled operations (the latter is shown in the link below) and whenever there are changes in the agent's beliefs, this implies the insertion of an event in the set of events. This belief revision function is also supposed to be agent specific.
After the Program has selected an event/case, the interpreter has to unify that event/case with triggering events in the minds of terrorists. This generates a set of all their relevant plans. By checking whether the context part of the plans in that set follow from the agent's beliefs, the interpreter determines a set of applicable plans (plans that can actually be used at that moment for handling the chosen event). Then it chooses a single applicable plan from that set, which becomes the intended plan for handling that event, and either pushes that plan on the top of an existing intention (if the event was an internal one), or creates a new intention in the set of intentions (if the event was external, i.e., generated from a perception of the environment).
All that remains to be done at this stage is to select a single intention to be executed in that cycle. The chosen Program function selects one of the agent's intentions (i.e., one of the independent stacks of partially instantiated plans within the set of intentions). On the top of that stack there is a plan, and the formula in the beginning of its body is taken for execution. This implies that a basic action is performed by the agent on its environment, an internal event is generated (in the case that the selected formula is an achievement goal), and a test goal is performed to get the set of beliefs in “useful Terror” checked.
In the case where a basic Counter-Terrorist action is selected, the necessary updating of the set of terrorists’ intentions is simply to remove that action from the intention (the interpreter informs to the agent effectors what action is required).
When all formula in the body of a plan have been removed (i.e., have been executed), the whole plan is removed from the intention, and so is the achievement goal that generated it. This ends a cycle of execution, and everything is repeated all over again, initially checking the state of the environment after agents have acted upon it, then generating the relevant events, and so forth.
Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) with unified indicators (indexes) of Public Security can integrate further Russia-NATO effort in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

Russian Internet-integrated M&E in the GWOT
Agents-based Public Security programs may and should replace traditional network-centric Anti-Terrorist warfare with “decisive” operations against the population. Military strikes are provocative to many social strata, which may form additional support to terrorist organizations, as we can see now and we’ll see in future. The present day outcomes of old Arab-Palestinian-Israel conflicts and military confrontations of the NATO-USA-Iran are vivid examples of provocative and responsive ‘Anti-Terrorism’ with its sheer military tools.
In the New Global War on Terrorism the aim is to develop non-military capabilities that can rapidly break terrorists’ will to fight and undermine their asymmetric striking capabilities.
The new concept of Public Security Strategy in GWOT can be called Agents-based operations (ABO). If it’s adopted by decision-makers in Russia and NATO, it will encompass processes, tools, and organizations that focus on planning, executing, and assessing counter-terrorist activities for the effects produced rather than merely scoring the number of terrorists and innocent civilians destroyed in Anti-Terrorism actions.
ABO practitioners draw on the full range of instruments of nation-wide power to anticipate, track, and understand the indirect as well as direct effects of the future Russia-NATO cooperation throughout the Global Counter-Terrorism social, political, military, and economic systems. We prefer to concentrate only on education issues here.
The ABO concept requires deep knowledge not of Terrorism alone but also of its friendly social capabilities and structures in and out the country. The current suite of analytic tools employed by the so-called Power Ministries (the Siloviki) cannot support this approach to counter-terrorist operations. These tools were not designed to determine how the use of military force affects adversary strategic will, to model adaptive behavior, to represent unintended consequences, or to evaluate alternative courses of action that include other instruments of national power beyond military force.
After the Cold War, Russia-NATO’s “romantic” relations, the dominant principle of present Anti-Terrorism planning has lead to the ability to employ mass law-enforcement forces at “key points” while preventing the terrorist adversary from doing the same.
Sheer military, not socio-economic success in the battle for the people confidence to a ruling power was understood to depend on the ability to dominate the enemy in an extended attrition campaign (like in Chechnya and Syria). However, the anti-terrorist operations that the Russian Military has been called on to execute have changed in character.
Social anomaly, not notorious “clashes of civilizations” or religious rivalry feeds terrorist activity from Below and enlarges popular support of Terrorism not the GWOT’s advocates.
Late NATO military involvements behind traditional boundaries in Europe are typically against Global Terrorism. In theory, global terror advocates have been nowhere near the military might of the Russia-NATO “virtual joint” forces. But even in this theoretical format these capabilities seem to be useless. Why so?
In future, Global Terrorism are not about to become limited to the classic cross-border invasion that leads to defined battle lines, with success measured by territory defended or gained. As demonstrated by all military operations of the 1990-s – up today, considerations of military superiority at strategic or operational levels are inappropriate when compared with other factors, such as the Global Terrorism's will to fight and local considerations of mini-tools of violence vs. military force. It allows asymmetric capabilities of terrorist organizations to be better employed, as we can see in fighting of the ISIS.
The new concept of Agents-Based Operations (ABO) is an effort to leverage (in the future) Russia-NATO military, science and technical might with advantages in computation, information, and analysis to achieve not only political-military, but socio-economic outcomes.
Making the ABO a reality will depend on developing and using appropriate analytic frameworks for Counter-Terrorism problems. These frameworks and associated methodologies will enable politicians and NGOs leaders to plan more effectively for joint GWOT actions in advance and then adapt those plans and rehearsed operations as terrorist threats situations unfold.
Future operations that reflect the principles of the ABO will require a joint Russia-NATO political-military leadership to understand the consequences of what may occur in the nearest future beyond immediate anti-terrorist (military) activities. Political and military decision-makers need a modeling framework that integrates old and new National & Public Security strategies. They include concepts such as the explicit linking of military actions to national strategy, the continual assessment of operational outcomes and unintended consequences, the coordination of interagency efforts, and the appropriate utilization of emerging Counter-Terrorism concepts. The ABO is one of them. Its core presents many variants of network-agents warning systems to prevent “decisive” operations with strikes at different strata of the population that only multiply potential supporters of Terror from Above and Below.
Conclusion
A central concern of this 1-st Seminar at the Soft Power School (The SPS) is that the current suite of analytic tools cannot represent all the aspects that interest Russia-NATO leaders and corresponding NGOs. The SPS strives to make their actions to remain mutually supportive.
The current tools of Hard Power can generate logistical and targeting plans for Terrorism from Below. The non-military schemes of Soft Power will influence the will of any terrorist organization adversary or the emergence of post-Counter-Terrorism situations.
Using differing mixtures of population support through NGOs and private funds, enforcement potentials as a New Public Security paradigm is a pioneering set of analytical tools to learn at the Soft Power School.
Thus monitoring and evaluation with shared indexes of Public Security can serve as a basic element of:
1.                  Joint efforts of NGOs in Public Security, Foreign & Military policy of Russia and NATO countries;
2.                  Public demands for stronger integration of Counter-Terrorism efforts could be satisfied far beyond traditional security and defense policy of the NATO, USA, EU and Russia;
3.                  There seem to be possible chances for a newly-born All-People Self-Defense vs. Autocracy Movement of NGOs to become active and attractive in Public Diplomacy and National Security after Putin who banned independent NGOs. But no one can ban education on the Internet vs. Tyranny and Autocracy.
A New Era for real Defenders of Russia is coming! Hurrah!
Vladimir Lukov (PhD), President and CEO of the Russian Soft Power School, 9524414@gmail.com
P.S. Your donations are more than welcome to the Sberbank card # 2202 2003 7037 5873, and PayPal to Vladimir Lukov (vlukov@dol.ru).




[1] See, the first lecture as an Invitation to the Soft Power School - https://russiancounterterror.blogspot.ru/2018/02/join-russian-soft-power-school.html; The second lecture (in Russian) - https://russiancounterterror.blogspot.ru/2018/02/2.html.  
[3] Kremlin says anti-corruption campaign in Dagestan not tied to politics - http://tass.com/politics/989065 
[4] Rensselaer Lee, Smuggling Armageddon: The Nuclear Black Market in the Former Soviet Union and Europe (St. Martin's-Palgrave, 1999); see also Vladimir Lukov “«Civil-Military Relations in Russia after the 9/11 events: From Nuclear Deterrence of Great Powers to Their Collective Restrain of Nuclear Terrorism» at the “Globalization of Civil-Military Relations: Democratization, Reform and Security”, Bucharest, 2002, p.608-630; «Ends and Means of Counter-Terrorism: New Human Intelligence», a report at the Euro Atlantic Security Study Group (EASSG) 19th Meeting, 19–21 September 2004, Siófok (Hungary), Kodolányi János University College; “Initiating people’s Human Intelligence in Counter-Terrorism” at The 20-th Meeting of the European Security Study, Berlin, Febr.8-9, 2005.
[5] How to Read Terrorists’ Minds? Please, see, details and exlanations - http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/8/3/7.html in an Interpretation Cycle of an AgentSpeak Program.    

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